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1 Introduction
There is great diversity in social science literature on such basic questions as what
is the proper way to conceptualize and analyze institutions. This is probably be-
cause the conceptual di¢ culties are almost inevitable [6]. In order to establish a
constructive interdisciplinary dialogue it is necessary to establish a common concep-
tual ground to facilitate the discussion. In this sense, it is usual to take any of the
many denitions of "institution" and from there proceed to work within the frame-
work of economic research. Many times, the denitions and interpretations of the
concept of institution are not explicit, as if there were an implicit consensus within
economic theory about the meaning. The problem is that there is no such consensus
on the denition of institution1. In this regard, it is a critical task of philosophy
to question, and if possible to answer, the ontology, form of existence and reality of
institutions. The contribution of John Searle on the construction of social reality
provides a foundation for the formal study of institutions, synthetized in his paper
"What is an institution?" [18]. However, Searles theory should not be regarded as a
contribution to political philosophy devoted to the establishment and procedures of
governments, rms, legal courts and the like. Instead, it aims at providing a general
foundation for social ontology, being a contribution to the philosophy of sociality.
Although Searles account of institution lacks mathematical precision and is not
formalized, it constitutes a useful basis to develop a formal characterization of the
concept of institution. For this porpose, some elements of Searles account must be
explicitly dened and further notions must be precisely introduced. These elements
are those referred to the processes carried out by individuals in order to establish
the existence of an institution, the set of information taken into account by them,
and their own belief about what others believe with regard to the existence of an
institution. Mainly, those ideas referred to the subjective nature of institutions
must be clearly specied. The cumbersome character of the ideas to be formalized,
leads to the need to illustrate them by means of a particular use of the concept of
institution. For these purposes, the characterization will be tried out for the concept
of institution present in New Institutional Economics (NIE).
Concerning the illustration, while the discipline recognizes the contributions of
Coase, Williamson and North as NIEs theoretical foundations, there is no explicit
agreement yet either on the characterization of NIE or its concept of institution.
However, the direct applicability of Searles account to the study of NIE´s idea of
institution is not clear. This may be because Searles work focused on the ontology,
existence and form of institutional reality, but not perspicuously enough to grasp
the use of the concept of institution in NIE due to its specicities2.
Given the above, we will attempt to explore the applicability of the formal char-
acterization proposed by Oliver Williamsons characterization of NIE in Markets
and hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications (a study in the economics of
internal organization) [23]. However, previously, it will be necessary to elucidate
1For an in- deph discussion, see Rationality,Institutions and Economic Methodology[11], in
which Uskali Mäki, Bo Gustafsson and Christian Knudsen take up, very clearly, the discussion
about the di¤erences between the two lines of thought, the debate on the concept of institution
and other dilemmas that revolve around institutions within science.
2See Searle [17] and [19].
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the implicit meaning of institution in the NIE.
This paper is organized as follows. In section two a review of the key notions
of Searle´s theory of institutions will be outlined. The third section is devoted to
ellucidating the concept of institution in the particular case of the New Institutional
Economics that will be used as an illustration in section four. The fourth section
will devided in two subsections. The rst proposes a formal and comprehensive
characterization of the concept of institution on the basis of some elements taken
from Searles conception exposed in section two. The second illustrates the formal
characterization previuosly presented by means a reconstraction of the concept of
institution at NIE following Williamson [23]. Finally, the last section is a synthesis
of the results arising from the analysis.
2 Searles theory of institutions
In recent years John Searle has developed a philosophical account of the structure of
social reality, that is to say, the fundamental nature and mode of existence of human
social institutional reality, its creation and maintenance3. The general question
to be answered by this account can be stated as follows: What is the ontology
of social reality? This question has also obvious implications for the ontology of
economics, in so far as economic phenomena are social. Searles account attempts to
solve traditional questions through a new conceptual framework within the analytic
tradition in philosophy and di¤erent from social theory or social constructivism.
Searles ideas evolved from his contributions to the philosophy of language, but
they have their roots in an important tradition of contemporary philosophy con-
cerning the intentionality of mental phenomena. The theory of speech acts led him
to the idea that language is a basic institutional phenomenon in social life. Gener-
alizing this claim, all social facts are of institutional nature. On this basis, it can
be argued that Economics is largely concerned with institutional facts ([18], p.
1). In few words, this means that the mode of existence of economic entities (e.g.
money, commodities, stock markets) is institutional. Institutional facts are facts
depending on human institutions (e.g. buying a piece of chocolate with a one dollar
bill). They exist as a result of attitudes, intentions, etc. There is a dependence on
human beings and their intentional states. In general, intentionality has to do with
the directedness of the individual mind; it is a feature of the mind by which it
is directed at objects and states of a¤airs (that must be objective). Hence, inten-
tionality is subjective and individual4 and the ontology underlying Economics is a
subjective ontology.
In order to justify these claims concerning the institutional character of social
facts, Searle follows the methodological tradition of analytical philosophy, so he
tries to achieve an elucidation of the nature of institutions by analysing statements
reporting institutional facts. Statements such as This is a one dollar bill, Paulo
is a graduate student in Economics, Benjamin is the father of Charles, Mardi
Gras is celebrated in New Orleans, She rents an apartment in downtown Buenos
3See mainly Searle [17] and [19].
4See chapter 2 of Searle [19] for a more detailed account of intentionality.
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Aires, etc. represent institutional facts. In his philosophical framework, Searle
includes some sort of realism concerning physical entities; a strong scientic realism,
according to which the basic facts of the structure of the universe are given by
natural science (physics, chemistry, biology, etc.). Social facts, on the contrary, are
observer dependent phenomenaand in their constitution subjective aspects play
a role, so that they presuppose a subjective ontology. Now, the main problem is:
to explain how there can be an epistemically objective institutional
reality of money, government, property, and so on, given that this reality
is in part constituted by subjective feelings and attitudes and, thus, has
a subjective ontology. [18], p. 4f.
According to Searle there are three5 basic notions that are indispensable in order
to characterize social reality:
1. The rst of these notions is collective intentionality. Individual behaviour is
just part of the collective action, where the intentions of the individuals are,
in an extremely complicate way, related to the collective intentionality that
constitutes the basis of society 6 However, it must be stressed that for Searle
collective intentionality is dependent on and derived from individual inten-
tionality 7 A brief explanation could be the following: Being A an individual
and ZZ a group of individuals performing an action collectively, A engages
in collective action, so A is doing what she does as part of the doing of
ZZ. Somehow, the intentionality of A is part of the collective intentionality
of ZZ. In short, any fact involving collective intentionality is a social fact
([17], p. 38). It must be stressed that in this account of social reality collective
intentionality functions as a primitive notion, even if it depends on individual
intentionality.
2. The second basic notion in the characterization of social reality is the assign-
ment of functions. Human beings have the capacity to assign specic functions
to objects (and also to persons). Tools are the simplest examples. An individ-
ual can use a trunk as a tool, a group of individuals can use a large trunk as
a bank. When this notion is combined with the previous notion of collective
intentionality, the idea of a collective assignment of functions arises: social
groups or communities assign functions to objects. Assigned functions are
observer relative.
3. The third basic notion is a special case of assignment of function to objects, the
status function. There are some actions that an object or person can perform
only by virtue of the fact that a certain status has been collectively assigned to
5Actually, Searle considers a fourth basic notion that he uses to explain intentionality: There are
preintentional capacities in the mind that enable intentional states. Searle calls these capacities
the Background, for further details see Searle ([17], p. 129¤). As this notion depends on a
particular thesis in Searle´s philosophy of mind and language, it will not be discussed here.
6Searle considers that human beings can engage in cooperative behavior and do not consider
non-cooperative actions as a possibility of collective action.
7See Searle ([19], p. 4). Hence, Searle presupposes methodological individualism.
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this object or person (so that this status is accepted by the group). A typical
case would be an instructor in his function of evaluating the written exams of
students.
Collective intentionality, as dened above, presupposes another attitude consist-
ing in the collective recognition of status function as characterized above. Particu-
larly, status functions can only work if they are collectively recognized. Collective
recognition is as an epistemic attitude, and it must be distinguished from both co-
operation and agreement. Searle makes this distinction explicitly: collective recog-
nition does not imply some degree of approval, and collective recognition need not
be a form of cooperation([19], pp. 57 f.)
However, Searle does not dedicate special attention to characterization of collec-
tive recognition and its main features. So, as some clarication is due, the following
interpretations of collective recognition will be proposed. Individual belief is presup-
posed in collective recognition; the individual recognition of status function takes
for granted the belief in its recognition by other members of the society. Thus,
collective recognition implies that each individual,
 comes individually to recognize a status function
 believes others have their own individual recognition of the status function,
and
 believes something8 about others, who are relevant for individual recognition
of this status function. Therefore, it can be argued that collective recognition
can be reduced to individual recognition plus their belief about individual
recognition of others9 .
Now, in terms of the rst three notions (collective intentionality, assignment of
functions and status functions) and in terms of the features proposed for the notion
of collective recognition: the general form X counts as Y in context C ., where
X represents certain features of an object, a person or a state of a¤airs, Y assigns
a special status to X, and C indicates that this assignment holds in a determinate
context (a legal framework in force, the situation of a group or a community, etc.)10
, and there exists collective recognition of Y , represents the form of institutional
facts. It is obvious that from this perspective, the coming into being of institutional
facts is a complex process, in which di¤erent intentional attitudes are simultaneously
involved.
If the institutional fact becomes regularized, it becomes a rule, and then it be-
comes an institutional structure. Here the term rulecan be understood in a dual
sense. First, a rule expresses a regularity in the social reality, and hence it expresses
a law in the social world. Second, it may express and explicit social norm, if the
institutional structure is formulated in a code11.
8That each of them recognizes or not individually the status function.
9This proposal may di¤er from Searles account, particularly in the idea of mutual belief, and
could be compared with Raimo Tuomelas approach [22].
10Of course, this general form can be iterative, that is, Y can include other institutional facts,
and the context can be institutional with their corresponding institutional context.
11In some cases it may be di¢ cult to distinguish the two senses.
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Anyway, the general form X counts as Y in Cexpresses also constitutive rules
of institutional structures. This means that they establish or constitute the institu-
tional practice or behaviour: Acting in accordance with such rules is constitutive of
the behaviour in question. Thus, the existence of the institutional fact (as institu-
tional) depends on the rule. From this basis, Searle claims that,
the institutional ontology of human civilization [. . . ] is a matter of states
functions imposed according to constitutive rules and procedures ([18],
p. 9)12.
Let us see, for example, the case of a real estate lease agreement. A written
signed piece of paper counts as a lease agreement in certain circumstances. This lease
agreement counts as assuming commitments, and assuming commitments counts as
a contract. These (constitutive) rules are instances of the mentioned form X counts
as Y in C. If there are no such rules, there exists no contract. On the other hand,
these rules carry rights and duties for the tenant and the landlord, regulated by the
same rules.
3 New Institutional Economics
The New Institutional Economics has been shaped primarily from the contributions
of Ronald Coase [3], [4] and [5], Oliver Williamson [23], [24] and [26], and Dou-
glass North [12], [13] and [14]. These authors consider institutions as a key factor in
explaining the di¤erences in performance between industries, nations and regions be-
cause they frame the behavior and the exchanges at the market, business networks,
communities and organizations, inuencing the results of their interactions. Accord-
ing to Norths characterization, NIE´s goal is to extend existing theory through the
incorporation of transaction costs that give rise to institutions in order to remove
the assumption of instrumental rationality. Not only North, but also Williamson,
in his own characterization of NIE, points out that what is done is complementary
to, and not a substitute for, traditional analysis (see [23], p. 1).
In short, according to NIE as described by North and Williamson, institutions
emerge from the existence of transaction costs that arise from the limited and in-
complete capacity of humans to analyze data which leads them to make decisions
resulting in imperfect markets. Thus, institutions are created in order to generate
exchange modes that reduce transaction costs. The two institutional modes in which
NIE focuses are: internalization of coordinating of resources allocation within the
rm (make) and coordinating of resources allocation through the market (buy). In
Williamsons words: I focus on transaction and the costs that attend completing
transaction by one institutional mode rather than another([23], p. 1).
12Searle distinguishes between two functions of constitutive rules. Constitutive rules of the form
X counts as Y in C, as mentioned above, determine or constitute a certain event or entity: an
institutional structure. But they also regulate behaviour, and, consequently, in most cases, they
behave also as regulative rules. Regulative rules are not necessarily constitutive; they can regulate
activities that exist independently of the rule.
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Going back to Ronald Coase [3], NIE tries to understand the reasons for coordi-
nating the allocation of resources using rms or market. Following Sykuta [21], the
explanation that Ronald Coase proposed to that enquiry was:
1. The price mechanism is not costless, so sometimes it would be cheaper to use
internal organization to allocate the resources.
2. The rms managerial and coordination costs increases at the same time the
rms scale and heterogeneity of transactions do. So, these costs will go on
increasing to the point where marginal cost of completing the transaction of
another resource into the rm is higher than attempting to complete that
transaction in the market.
So, the decision to internalize resource allocations or use price mechanisms can be
made using a marginalist approach. This approach is to compare the marginal cost
of transacting an additional unit of resource by each institutional mode. In simpler
words, the aim is to decide whether to make or buy it. The market institution refers
to a broad manner in which price and quantity for trade are agreed. In the ordinary
sense a market is a physical place where there are sellers o¤ering products or services
they want to sell, and buyers who want to buy them. In an institutional sense, the
market is a specic mode of transaction governed by a price mechanism.
Typically, there is a price posted by a seller and xed for some duration. Then,
each buyer can accept or reject this price. Sometimes, the price posted can be seen
as an invitation to negotiation, so buyers will o¤er a lower sum that can be accepted
or rejected, and so on, until the time at which it is decided whether or not the
transaction is performed. Of course, there are many other possible combinations of
market structures and sequences of interaction between bids and o¤ers to reach the
quantity and price that will govern the transaction.
Initially, the transaction in the market, roughly speaking, would be the simplest
and more usual way to transact. In a monetary economy, the market transaction
may simply imply an exchange where the buyer gives to the seller a monetary sum
according to the price posted by the latter and then receives from it the good or
service purchased. Since dealing with suppliers and subcontractors entails risks and
incentive problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection [15], transaction at
the market may be more complicated in relation with the simplest example. Then
it would be benecial to take precautions in order to ensure the fulllment of the
promises in each of the situations that could trigger a default of them. This leads
to two observations:
1. Taking precautions is expensive.
2. It is impossible to know all the states of nature that would lead to a breach of
promise, which means that the transaction has an inherent risk.
As further precautions are taken to ensure the fulllment of promises, risk is
reduced but the transaction costs rise to the point where it is more convenient to
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internalize the activity (make) instead of performing the market transaction (buy)13.
At the other extreme, there is the option to coordinate the allocation of resources
into the rm in order to avoid market risks. It is the so called hierarchies scheme,
where there are people (employees) that promise to fulll certain kind of tasks they
are commanded to (subordinate to the authority) by other people (employers or
their representatives) as long as they are promised a remuneration (wage) for their
activities within the organization. It should be noted that as in market transactions,
the coordination of the allocation of resources within the rm involve promises,
which again involves risks, such as moral hazard and incentive problems. In part,
the employment relationship reduces risk because the existence of a lasting bond
between the parties creates incentives for both of them to fulll their promises.
Then, the existence of certain states of nature that can lead to non-fulllment of
the promises establishes the framework for the emergence of new institutions aimed
at reducing the costs associated with those risks (e.g. unions, labor contracts, labor
laws).
4 A formal characterization of institution
Even if Searles presentation of the structure of instititutional facts is perhaps too
simplistic, lacks mathematical precision and is not formal enough to adequately
express phenomena such as iteration, the foundation of rules and norms or the
clear distinction between generic facts and specic cases, it constitutes a useful
cornerstone to develope a more general, comprehensive and formal characterization
of the concept of institution. For this purpose a formal characterization14 of the
concept based on denition of its constituent elements and the bond between them
will be proposed.
In order to provide an intuitive illustration of the attributes of the proposal,
will be attempt to reconstruct Williamsons account, and to study the causes and
e¤ects of di¤erent modes for governing the allocation and coordination of resources
in an economy in terms of the characterization. So, the problem will consist in
determining the di¤erent processes of buying and making as institutional modes
by means of which the allocation of resources can be accomplished. The main idea
should be that the usual coordination mode of allocation of resources for a task is
the fact that gives rise to an institution.
This section is divided into two stages, a rst one where the formal characteriza-
tion is proposed and a second one with an illustration based on the NIEs concept
of institution.
13It seems evident that between the market and the rm there is a wide grey range of organiza-
tional structure. The complexity of this great gray area, "hybrid" accordingly to Williamson [25],
is widely covered by contractual theories. However, the analysis of it is outside the scope of this
paper.
14Although the epistemic game theory would be an interesting approach, for the purposes of
dealing with an appropiate extension of Searles account, the characterization will be carried out
by direct stretch of his original formalization.
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4.1 The proposal
In a rst aproximation, an institution will be a system of institutional structures
compounded by institutional facts, where the institutional facts obey the general
structure "X counts as Y in context C" by virtue of the collective acceptance that
something (X) has a certain status (Y ). So, the main task is to dene the elements
X, Y and C and the collective acceptance.
The rst step will be to dene the context:
Denition 1 Context: A context C will be conceived as a nite set,
C : hW1;W2; : : : ;Wni
With n nite, of facts or events of every kind.
A context15 Cj will be a particular context j. Intuitively, the context is com-
pounded by the whole world information.
Given that context C has been characterized, it is necessary to make it clear that
the individual does not necessarily have access to the entire set Cj of information,
so Qij will be the available information subset for individual i included in Cj. So,
Qij  Cj:
Lets dene the constitutive elements of the institutional fact X and Y :
Denition 2 Aspect of an object, or person or a¤air: Xn is an aspect of
an object, or person or a¤air that has the property to be assigned a status function.
With n nite.
Denition 3 Status Assignation: Y is a specic function that can be assigned
to an object, a person or a¤air. This status can be assigned individually by virtue
of the individual acceptance that something has this status or jointly by virtue of the
collective acceptance that something has this status.
Some examples of status assignation are given in section two. Once that it has
been established that the individual has limited information of the world and there
have been dened the elements of the structure "X counts as Y in context C" which
may be considered an institutional fact by virtue of the collective recognition, the
next step is to dene the collective recognition. In order to dene it, lets rst
characterize the individual recognition as the result of a process made by individual
i in order to establish her own individual recognition of a certatin status assignation.
Denition 4 Individual Recognition: kin, with n nite, is the result of individual
recognition proceess Hi(Qij) made by the individual i using her Q
i
j available infor-
mation of the context Cj, with relation to certain status asignation Y over Xn. So,
kin = Hi(Q
i
j).
There are two aspects of the result kin of i individual recognition necessary to be
highlighted:
15For the present discussion is not essential to make a neat distinction between facts and events
as ontological entities.
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1. The process Hi is subjective to each individual i and takes into account in-
formation in Qij that may include some elements that will not necessarily be
quantitative.
2. About the i evaluation process Hi, since it is particular and subjective to each
individual, it can only be said that it is the process used by the individual i to
decide whether Xn may receive the individual status assignation Y . In other
words, kin, for each n, may represent the recognition that, for i, a particular
(object, person or a¤air) Xn has the the status asignation Y .
Once the individual recognition has been dened , the next step is to establish
the necessary elements to characterize collective recognition. Now, we will establish
Ri as the set of T individuals r whose individual recognition is relevant for i, where:
Ri : fr1; : : : ; i; : : : ; rTg
Note that obviously, i is included in its own Ri set of T relevant individuals r
for itself.
As individual i cannot be certain about the actual individual recognition of each
r (r 6= i) individual compounded in Ri, i will have its own belief Kir;n for each r0s
individual recognition, with n nite and r included in Ri set of T relevant individuals
for i. For the particular case r = i, then Kii;n = k
i
n. This means that i can be certain
about is own individual recognition, so what i believes about is own recognition is
actually what i recognizes.
In order to complete the characterization of the collective recognition, once in-
dividual recognition has been dened, the set of Ri individuals whose individual
recognition is relevant for i and is belief of rs individual recognition, as individual
i will not assign the same importance to each rs individual recognition, it will be
established ir as the relative importance assigned by i to r individual recognition
(according to i belief:Kir;n ), where,
PT
r=1 
i
r = 1
Finally, the individual collective recognition will be characterized as the result of
a process by which each i individual will dene her belief of collective recognition.
Denition 5 Individual Collective Recognition: Ain, with n =nite,.is the re-
sult of is process Gi, to establish is own belief in the collective recognition, where i
assigns di¤erent weights to what i believes about the individual recognition of the T
individuals r included in set Ri of relevant individuals for i, so: Ain = G
i(irK
i
r;n).
Following Searles theory of institutions, the denition of institutional facts, in-
stitutional structure and institution will be:
Denition 6 Institutional Fact: Any event that obeys the general structure "X
counts as Y in C ", by virtue of collective recognition that something has a certain
status.
Denition 7 Institutional Structure: Is a procedure X counts as Y regularized
as a constitutive rule.
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Denition 8 Institution: Is a system of institutional structures.
It is extremely important to note the presence of the subjectivity of i (i) at her
individual process of individual recognition (as well as r do), (ii) at her subjective
construction of Ri set of T relevant individual recognition individuals, (iii) at her
belief of others individual recognition, (iv) at the weight i applies to her belief of the
individual recognition of other individuals, and (v) at her own process to reach her
belief on the collective recognition. Once claried, the existence of an institutional
fact is subjective to each individual.
Then, summing up Searle, once the institutional fact regularizes (rules), it be-
comes an institutional structure, and nally if there exists a system of rules, an
institution is formed according to Searle´s conception. Now, as noted in the previ-
ous paragraph, the idea of regularization is subjective to each individual.
4.2 An illustration
For the pourposes of the illustration, the main task is to x the values of X, Y
and C for the specic case of coordination of allocation of resources and dene the
collective acceptance in this particular case.
First it will be necesary to dene two relevant subsets belonging to the context
C. These will be the information of costs subsets:
Let f and m be two subsets such that: f;m  C, and containing the whole
information about the direct and indirect costs related to the accomplishment of
the transaction in a specic way. Here, m included in C is the subset of direct and
indirect information of the costs of coordinating the allocation of resources by the
market and f does the same with the rm.
Now, a particular context Cj will be composed of n facts or elements where we
will just be concerned about those included in subsets f and m that contain only
information referred to costs. So, a particular context j is:
Cj : hf;m; : : :i
There are two aspects of context Cj necessary to be highlighted:
1. f and m include values that are not necessarily quantitative (e.g. m may
include information related to the risk associated to the accomplishment of
the transaction through the market).
2. These costs also include the costs associated to coordinate the resource allo-
cation in a particular way (i.e. the famous transaction costs). Some examples
are moral hazard, managing, etc.
In this case, the available information Qij  Cj will be a subset that contains
among its elements some available information respect to m and f for the individual
i.
Lets dene the Y status assignation and X that represents aspects of an object
or person or a¤air. In this particular case, the status assignation Y will be the way
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of coordinating the resource allocation and Xn is a specic way of coordinating the
resource allocation, with n = 1; 2.
Now the two specic Xn can be considered:
 X1 : Buy.
 X2 : Make.
So, X1 (buy) or X2 (make) may receive the status assignation Y (is the
way of coordinating the resource allocation) in a particular context Cj16.
It must be remembered that this structure (X counts as Y in C) may be
considered as an institutional fact by virtue of the Collective Recognition.
To reach collective recognition in this particular case, rst it must be stablished
that the result of the individual recognition process Hi(Qij) may have as result a
value kin, with n = 1; 2.
Then, kin can adopt two values for each n:
 ki1 : is individual is recognition that buy is the way of coordinating the resource
allocation.
 ki2 : is individual is recognition that make is the way of coordinating the
resource allocation.
The individual i relevant set of individuals Ri will not have any particularity
in this case. Here the individual belief of the individual recognition Kir;n of other
individuals will be is belief of each r individual recognition. With n = 1; 2 and r
included in Ri set of T relevant individuals for i. So, Kir;n can adopt two values for
each n:
 Kir;1 : is is belief that r individually recognize that buy is the way of coordi-
nating the resource allocation.
 Kir;2 : is is belief that r individually recognize that make is the way of coor-
dinating the resource allocation.
Then, the individual i collective recognition Ain can adopt two values for each n:
 Ai1 : is i0s belief that there is a collective recognition that buy is the way of
coordinating the resource allocation in context Cj.
 Ai2 : is i0s belief that there is a collective recognition that make is the way of
coordinating the resource allocation in context Cj.
Once the values have been xed that the elements of the structure X counts as
Y in Ccan adopt for the particular case of the institutional modes of coordinating
the resource allocation in NIE (Williamsons account), and once the collective recog-
nition has been characterized, in this framework there exist two relevant disjointed
institutional facts for individual i:
16Compounded by n elements, where the only relevant ones are those related to the costs of
coordinating the resource allocation in a specic way being included in subsets m and f depending
if they are related to buy or make as the specic way of coordinating the resource allocation.
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 X1 counts as Y in Cj (Buy counts as the way to coordinate the resource
allocation in specic context Cj).
 X2 counts as Y in Cj (Make counts as the way to coordinate the resource
allocation in specic context Cj).
By virtue of is Ain belief of collective recognition
17.
In fact, these sentences represent general (institutional) facts, that are (hypo-
thetically) valid in every time and space, given certain context. They can be used
as basis for norms and can have instances related to specic situations, processes
and objects, in a particular space and time. These facts are economic facts, because
they refer to the allocation of resources.
It may be observed that both the regularized way of coordinating the allocation
of resources as well as the context itself can prompt the rise of further institutional
facts. This is keeping with Searle´s idea that institutions can be iterative. Regarding
Searle´s account, let us consider an example of iterated institutional facts for this
illustration. As seen in section 2, Searle considers that an institutional fact is any
fact that can be represented through the semiformal structure: X counts as Y in C.
Suppose now the case of make. Coordinating the allocation of resources within the
rm (X2) counts as a regulated way of coordinating the allocation of resources (Y )
in a given context Cj. But this institutional fact gives rise to the possibility that
the rm can provide the market with a new good or service in which case a further
institutional fact (thinking about NIE) will take place, and so on.
5 Conclusion
In the preceding sections the main elements of Searles theory of institution were
presented, improved and expanded in order to get a comprehensive and formal
characterization of the concept of institution. This characterization has displayed
the subjective features of the processes carried out by individuals to establish the
existance of an institution including elements referred to a limited set of information
available to individuals, their beliefs and evaluations of others beliefs.
To illustrate the use of the characterization proposed, the particular use of the
concept of institution at NIE was presented. After attempting an elucidation of
the implicit meaning of institution in the particular case of NIE (more precisely
Williamsons characterization of NIE), it was reconstructed by means of the formal
characterization proposed. It has been found that, in NIE, the notion of institution
is implicit in the analysis of the di¤erent modes for governing the allocation and
coordination of resources in an economy. In the illustration, the two di¤erent modes
of buy and make are described as modes of institutional facts. According to
NIE, the elements in each case have specic features that have their origin in the
context of the two di¤erent ways of attempting to complete transactions. So, in
the illustration, the description provides an elucidation of the social ontology un-
derlying these economical phenomena, giving an answer to the questions referred to
17These institutional facts in terms of Searle [18] are those institutional modes noted by
Williamson [23].
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ontology, existence and form of institutional reality that takes into account the NIE
specicities. Now, the notion of institution resulting from the framework of the NIE
(at least as dened by Williamson) has been analyzed, and ts properly, whith some
reservations, in Searles formal characterization based on the general structure X
counts as Y in context C.
Although this is a rst approach and it is expected to extend the analysis to
other economic elds, the preceding discussion suggests that economical phenomena
may be regularized actions of economic agents which are the result of collective
recognition and of their particular actions, such as assignment of functions to objects
and they have the formal structure rst dened by Searle.
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